Evidencia de Too-Big-to-Fail en la Banca Ecuatoriana

Giovanni Manuel Pérez, Miguel Ruíz Martínez, José Francisco Rubio Zambrano

Resumen


Existe evidencia empírica que sugiere que las instituciones financieras consideradas demasiado grandes para fracasar, "too-big-to-fail" (TBTF), gozan de una ventaja competitiva, en términos de un menor costo de fondeo, frente a instituciones más pequeñas. Estas ventajas no solo afectan la libre competencia en el sistema, sino también incrementan el riesgo moral. Como resultado, el sistema financiero se vuelve más frágil ante eventuales problemas de solvencia de una de estas instituciones. El presente trabajo de investigación pretende establecer si es que el grupo de bancos privados grandes del sistema financiero ecuatoriano goza de los beneficios asociados con las TBTF. En concreto se busca determinar si los bancos grandes obtienen fondos del público a una menor tasa de interés que los bancos pequeños. Los resultados de este análisis sugieren que, para el periodo comprendido entre los años 2007 y 2014, los bancos grandes del sistema ecuatoriano se han beneficiado de un menor costo de fondeo que los bancos pequeños.


Palabras clave


Sistema financiero; Bancos; Crisis bancaria; "too-big-to-fail"; Costo de depósitos

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