Open negotiation methodology and its effectiveness in the commercial field of Ecuador
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Abstract
The open negotiation procedure seeks to direct the parties towards viable agreements, based on the transparency of the information. In order to test this hypothesis, a laboratory test was carried out, in which a group of respondents was subjected to two scenarios, one that served as control and the other on which variables of experimental interest operated. The results of the investigation were conclusive regarding the application of a predictive model in the negotiation processes, whose theorem is as follows: the parties will reach an agreement only after having reached the point of convergence of their opportunity costs. In addition, a counter-factual axiom of the open negotiation was found: the negotiation processes in which the parties do not provide relevant and relevant information, regarding their situation and expectations, or speculate with it, do not become viable, beneficial or sustainable. According to this new paradigm, it is more profitable to inform, rather than suppose, to hide or speculate.
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