Metro de Quito: Better or Bitter? Analysis of "Getting Around Quito"
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Abstract
The case study illustrates not only the policy dilemma faced by Barrera (mayor of Quito) but also expounds on his decisions favoring Metro over Rapid Train Light Rail System (TRAQ) and the Bus Rapid Transit System (BRT). While Barrera considers TRAQ and BRT as temporary patches to the permanent problem of Quito public transit, in order to understand and justify the mayor's decision, the "Metro de Quito: Better or Bitter?" analysis employs the concepts of Public Administration (including efficiency and public-service efficiency and the new public management, rational choice and public choice, public authority and bureaucracy, blame-avoidance and conflict of interest etc.) Making 'quality transit' as a campaign promise and then living up to the promise; this reflects the way Barrera enshrines the public amid other stakeholders such as council members, the city officials and investors. Finally, now that metro is actually in the second phase of construction, the analysis suggests mitigation planning, financing schemes, historic heritage protection, transparency unit and building of in-house capacity to ensure long-term maintenance of the huge infrastructure. Importantly, to make Metro de Quito "better", the way to go is to forget the "bitter" past.
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